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THE RE-BIRTH OF THE BROADCAST FLAG: WHY CONGRESS SHOULD 
PROTECT CONSUMER RIGHTS BEFORE EXPANDING THE FEDERAL 
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION’S JURISDICTION. 
INTRODUCTION 
 A critical debate is underway in the Senate about how to 
protect copyrighted television signals in new digital form.1  
Congress has mandated that all analog television broadcasts be 
converted to digital form by 2009.2  Digital television would 
improve picture quality for everyone, even for consumers that 
only receive over the air free channels.3 
 The FCC is in charge of this transition, but fears that 
movie studios will refuse to convert their movies and television 
programs into digital format.4  The studios worry that viewers 
can too easily record digital broadcasts and upload them to the 
Internet, thereby violating their copyright protection.5  It’s 
                     
1 See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., Implications of the Broadcast 
Flag: A Public Interest Primer (Version 2.0) 10 (2003), 
available at http://www.cdt.org/ 
copyright/031216broadcastflag.pdf (summarizing the unique 
copyright effects of the broadcast flag)(hereinafter Ctr. for 
Democracy & Tech). 
2 Id. 
3 FCC, Digital Television (DTV) Regulatory Information (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2004), available at http://www.fcc.gov/dtv. 
4 In the Matter of Digital Broadcast Copy Protection, Joint 
Comments of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., et. 
al., MB Docket No. 02-230, at I. (Dec. 6, 2002), available at 
http://www.mpaa.org/Press/MPAA_Comments_02-230.pdf) [hereinafter 
MPAA Comments]. 
5 Id.; See Stephen Labaton, F.C.C. Acts Against Pirating of TV 
Broadcasts, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 2003, at C1. 
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quite likely the movie industry will face the same digital 
piracy issues the music industry is facing.6 
 Even if the movie studios agree to convert their shows from 
analog to digital, it is unclear how this transition will take 
place.7  The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) attempted 
to set the standard for digital television (“DTV”) broadcasts by 
proposing the broadcast flag regime.  The flag appeals to movie 
studios because it digitally locks DTV broadcasts to safeguard 
against illegal redistribution of television content.8  Under the 
proposed FCC order, the flag would be required on all new 
televisions, DVD players, computers, and any other device that 
could receive or playback television content.9 
 However, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals struck 
down the proposed FCC broadcast flag order down because it 
exceeded the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction.10  The FCC has never 
attempted to regulate playback devices.11  To justify this 
expansion of power, the FCC reasoned that the broadcast flag was 
necessary to assure content makers that their copyrighted 
                     
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. (products currently on the market would fall under a 
“legacy” exception and would still be able to receive digital 
television signals.) 
10 Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
11 See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech, supra note 1 (the FCC has 
traditionally only regulated devices that receive television 
content rather than devices that playback content). 
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material would be protected against digital piracy.12  The court 
rejected the FCC’s argument.13  As a result, the Senate is 
considering granting the FCC additional power.14 
 However, the court of appeal did not discuss the consumers 
also have rights at stake.15  Because it is unclear how the 
broadcast flag will be implemented, consumers’ fair use right to 
record and playback television programs could be limited.16  As 
technologies evolve, consumers’ access to information should 
also evolve.  However, the broadcast flag could limit the 
expansion of consumers’ access to information by restricting 
time and place shifting.17  Moreover, the public’s right to 
receive information is protected by the First Amendment. 18  As a 
                     
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 See Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d at 708 (The Court of 
Appeals did not analyze consumer rights, even though Petitioners 
did address the argument in their briefs, because as a threshold 
issue the court found that the FCC did not have jurisdiction to 
pass the broadcast flag order.). 
16 The fair use right to time-shift content was protected by the 
Supreme Court in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-55 (1984)(holding that consumers’ right 
to time-shift, recording a television broadcast for later 
viewing - constitutes fair use.  However, the Court did not 
explicitly protect space-shifting, recording a television 
broadcast for personal use and shifting the recording to another 
playback device in one’s house or car.) 
17 See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech, supra note 1. 
18 See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) 
("[The First Amendment] rests on the assumption that the widest 
possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public. 
. . ."); Lamont v. Postmaster General of the United States, 381 
U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).  
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result, consumers’ constitutional rights could be violated by 
the broadcast flag. 
 In addition, the broadcast flag would have required all 
devices capable of playing television content (demodulator 
devices) to be approved by the FCC before their use, including 
homemade devices.19  As a result, all computer networks built by 
novice computer programmers to play digital television 
programming would be outlawed unless approved by the FCC.20  Home 
networks use open source code, and evolving First Amendment 
jurisprudence has protected computer code as speech.21  As a 
                     
Nevertheless, "[t]he dissemination of ideas can accomplish 
nothing if otherwise willing addresses are not free to receive 
and consider them"; Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976). 
The First Amendment "protection afforded is to the 
communication, to its source and to its recipients both."; The 
right to receive information and ideas is an inherent corollary 
of the rights of free speech and press that are explicitly 
guaranteed by the Constitution. Board of Educ., Island Trees 
Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); 
CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395-96 (1981) (The First 
Amendment includes "the right of the public to receive suitable 
access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas 
and experiences. . . .") (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)); The right of the public to 
receive suitable access to social, political, aesthetic, moral, 
and other ideas and experiences may not be constitutionally 
abridged either by Congress or by the Federal Communications 
Commission. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 
(1969). 
19 See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech, supra note 1. 
20 See id. (novice programmers build home networks that use open 
source computer code that is capable of recording and playing 
back high television programming.) 
21 See Junger v. Daley, 209 F3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000)(holding that 
even functional computer code is protected by the First 
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result, the broadcast flag could create an unconstitutional 
prior restraint on the First Amendment rights of private home 
programmers.22 
 As a result, the Senate should ensure these rights are 
protected before it grants the FCC additional jurisdiction to 
order a broadcast flag.  Otherwise, the courts should invalidate 
the broadcast flag as a violation of fair use and first 
amendment rights. 
 This Note examines the problems surrounding the 
implementation of a broadcast flag including: infringing First 
Amendment and fair use rights by limiting the public’s access to 
information and banning the creation of specific software.  Part 
I discusses the history behind the broadcast flag.  Part II 
analyzes the public rights at stake.  Finally, Part III analyzes 
how the broadcast flag could violate these rights, and why 
courts should protect these rights if Congress does not. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE BROADCAST FLAG 
A. DEFINTION OF THE BROADCAST FLAG 
 The broadcast flag, or Redistribution Control Descriptor23, 
is a digital code embedded in a digital broadcasting stream. 
                     
Amendment); see also Universal Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F3d 
429 (2nd Cir. 2001). 
22 A prior restraint occurs when a state actor requires a speaker 
to get permission before speaking.  The Supreme Court has ruled 
that prior restraints are given the utmost scrutiny and are 
frowned upon.  See Freedman 
23 Id. 
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This prevents digital television reception equipment from 
redistributing digital broadcast content.24  The effectiveness of 
the broadcast flag regime is dependent on programming being 
flagged, and receiving devices recognizing the flag.    
 Thus, the flag requires new demodulator products (e.g., 
televisions, etc.) to include flag-recognition technology.25  
This technology, in combination with broadcasters’ use of the 
flag, would prevent redistribution of broadcast programming by 
limiting the capacity of receiver devices.26 
B. HOW THE BROADCAST FLAG TECHNOLOGY WORKS 
 The broadcast flag creates a regulatory and technological 
framework for controlling the redistribution of DTV broadcasts 
received over the air by consumers.27  DTV works in essentially 
the same way as traditional analog broadcasting, but because 
digital signals can be compressed more tightly on the 
electromagnetic spectrum, and because interference does not 
degrade signals as much, DTV allows for more information to be 
transmitted at a higher quality and resolution.28  As a result, 
                     
24 See id. at 16,027. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 See In the Matter of Digital Broadcast Content Protection, 
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, MB 
Docket No. 02-230, P 4 (Nov. 4, 2003), available at 
http://www.commreg.pf.com/Pfdocuments/FCCRcdPDFs/Fcc03-273.pdf 
[hereinafter FCC Report and Order]. 
28 Id. 
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there is an increased worry by movie studios that high quality 
illegal copies will be distributed on the Internet.29 
 Essentially, the broadcast flag, including both the flag 
that is tattooed onto the DTV signal and the FCC rules requiring 
technology to recognize the flag, is a mechanism for expanding 
copyright protection that movie studios enjoy for DTV 
broadcasts.30  It achieves this by acting like an invisible 
tattoo on a DTV signal that requires special glasses to reveal 
its presence.   
 The "flag" itself is simply a small amount of data added to 
the DTV signal that cannot be seen, but that with the 
appropriate technology can provide commands to the receiving 
device.31  Thus, if a DTV signal tattooed with this "flag" is 
received by a television equipped to recognize its presence, the 
television will read the flag and obey whatever command its data 
carry.32  On the other hand, if the same "flagged" signal is 
received by a DTV that is not equipped with flag-recognition 
technology, the set will display the accompanying video content, 
ignoring the flag.33  Accordingly, the flag embedded in the 
                     
29 See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(14). 
30 Id. 
31 FCC Report and Order ¶ 13, J.A. 1260. 
32 Id. ¶ 40, J.A. 1274. 
33 See id. 
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signal cannot do anything unless the device receiving the 
broadcast signal is equipped with flag-recognition technology.34 
C. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE BROADCAST FLAG 
 In August 2002, the FCC issued a notice of proposed 
rulemaking regarding digital broadcast copy protection.35  The 
Commission sought input on whether to adopt broadcast flag 
technology to prevent the unauthorized copying and 
redistribution of digital media.36   
 In November 2003, the FCC adopted the broadcast flag 
regulations, which required that all devices capable of 
receiving digital television broadcast signals, manufactured on 
or after July 1, 2005, include technology to recognize and 
implement the broadcast flag.37  The Commission explained that 
the threat of mass indiscriminate redistribution, although not 
imminent, could deter high value digital broadcasts.38  It also 
argued that the situation demanded preemptive action to assure 
content owners that DTV broadcasts will not be indiscriminately 
redistributed.39 
 The Commission also adopted an interim policy for approving 
the technologies that could be employed by demodulator products 
                     
34 Id. ¶¶ 13, 39, J.A. 1260, 1273. 
35 See Digital Broadcast Copy Protection, 17 F.C.C.R. 16,027 
(2002) (herinafter Notice of Proposed Order). 
36 See id. at  16,028-29. 
37 See Digital Broadcast Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550 
(2003) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 73, 76). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 23,552. 
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to comply with the requirements of the Flag Order, and issued a 
further notice of proposed rulemaking to address this and other 
issues.40 
 The FCC Order required all “demodulation devices” (DTV 
tuners, personal computers, digital VCRs, DVD recorders, and 
personal video recorders) that are capable of directly receiving 
DTV signals and have digital outputs, to incorporate the flag-
recognition technology by July 1, 2005.41  The rule prohibited 
these devices from sending flagged digital content to any other 
downstream device that is not "compliant."42  Once a television 
equipped to read the flag recognizes its presence, the 
television is unable to send the content outside its walls 
unless it does so through approved protection technology.43 
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE BROADCAST FLAG 
A. PRACTICAL IMPACT OF THE BROADCAST FLAG 
 As a practical matter, this means that the flagged digital 
content is thereafter blocked from distribution over the 
internet, over any managed network outside the consumer's home 
system, and to any other electronic device such as a cell phone, 
personal computer ("PC"), digital VCR, or DVD recorder unless 
                     
40 See id. at 23,574-79. 
41 J.A. 1294-95. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. ¶ 13, J.A. 1260. 
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that device is itself equipped to preserve the "robustness" of 
the flag.44   
 It is as if the bookstore tells you what you can and can’t 
do with a book you purchase (e.g. read it once) and requires you 
to enforce those limitations on transferees of the book.  Thus, 
if after reading the book, you give it to a friend, with the 
same restrictions (can only be read once) and it has already 
been read, then the friend has the book, but can’t read it 
(access) it.   
 The broadcast flag thus has a wide sweep.  It creates a 
whole new regime of technical and copyright-related regulation 
in one stroke: design regulation of electronic consumer 
equipment, restrictions on internet use, licensing requirements 
for downstream devices, and rules that will impede consumers 
from engaging in lawful uses of broadcast material.45   
 The effects of the scheme are forbidding.  The FCC 
characterized the cost of the Flag regime as "minimal,"46 and the 
record lacked conclusive quantitative data regarding its cost.  
However, it is clear that the Flag regime costs something, and 
                     
44 Id. ¶ 5, J.A. 1256-57, 1275-77. 
45 See, e.g., Reply Comments of Philips Electronics North America 
Corp. (herinafter Philips Reply), J.A. 1020; Comments of 
Electronic Privacy Information Center (hereinafter EPIC 
Comments), J.A. 734; Comments of Verizon, J.A. 936-37. 
46 FCC Report and Order at ¶ 20, J.A. 1263. 
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the added cost will likely be borne by consumers.47  The 
encryption required to preserve the flag's robustness in 
connection with downstream devices further compounds these 
costs.48  Indeed, the FCC acknowledged that "[t]here may be 
additional cost[s] to implement the flag to the extent 
manufacturers cannot or do not rely on existing content 
protection technologies."49 
 The Flag requirement also increases the complexity and 
diminishes the functionality of a broad range of consumer 
electronics devices.50  Consumers will have to determine whether 
their existing peripheral devices will be compatible with flag-
equipped devices, whether flag-compliant devices from different 
manufacturers are interoperable, and what uses of flagged 
content will be permitted.51  For instance, any flagged broadcast 
material that is recorded onto a DVD will not be viewable on 
existing non-flag-compliant DVD players.52 
B. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE BROADCAST FLAG 
 The Broadcast Flag Order aims at a copyright problem, 
studios' fear of indiscriminate redistribution of their 
                     
47 See id. ¶ 19 n.45, J.A. 1263. Comments of Public Knowledge and 
Consumers Union, J.A. 908; Comments of Veridian Corp., J.A. 648-
49. 
48 Comments of Electronic Frontier Foundation (hereinafter EFF 
Comments), J.A. 722-24. 
49 FCC Report and Order ¶ 14 n.29, J.A. 1261. 
50 EFF Comments, J.A. 718-21; Consumers Comments, J.A. 917. 
51 Id. 
52 FCC Report and Order ¶ 21 n.47, J.A. 1263-64; see also EFF 
Comments, J.A. 721. 
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copyrighted content53, but it is not typical copyright law.54 
Instead of focusing on infringing uses of DTV broadcasts (taping 
a show and selling copies, for example), this new kind of 
regulation puts the government in the business of redesigning 
products that might be used to infringe.55  In the process, it 
locks out many non-infringing uses, including fair uses of 
copyright, innovative technologies, and open source developers.56  
Because these collateral harms are unavoidable, technology 
mandates should be a last resort, not a predictive strike 
against hypothetical danger. 
 The Flag scheme affects consumers by indiscriminately 
restricting uses of broadcast programming, and does so 
regardless of whether these programs are entitled to copyright 
protection, or are even copyrightable.57  For example, if the 
Flag rules stay in place, consumers will not be able to send any 
portion of a flagged DTV broadcast over the Internet for any 
reason.58   
                     
53 Digital Broadcast Content Protection, 68 Fed. Reg. 67,599 
(Dec. 3, 2003) (codified at 47 C.F.R. 73.9000-73.9009 (2004)) 
(justifying the broadcast flag as necessary "to preserve the 
viability of over-the-air broadcasting" from the threat of 
illegal internet redistribution). 
54 See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., supra note 4(summarizing the 
copyright effects of the broadcast flag). 
55 Id. 
56 See id. 
57 EFF Comments, J.A. 721; Comments of Computer & Communications 
Industry Association ("CCIA"), J.A. 688. 
58 Id. 
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 Under the flag, consumers could not e-mail a clip of a DTV 
broadcast to an office, second home, or traveling family member, 
even if the clip was uncopyrighted or it was newsworthy, such as 
the State of the Union Address.59  In addition, consumers could 
not use any clip that has been marked with the flag to make, 
illustrate, or rebut an argument in an Internet discussion 
group, website, or "blog.”60  In addition, consumers could not 
share a clip of a DTV broadcast with a virtual classroom during 
a distance learning lesson, or create original works using the 
DTV broadcasts in ways that have not yet been conceived.61  No 
one may be able to fully assess the extent of this loss, since 
the new rule will halt creativity and innovation before it can 
blossom. 
 The technical specifications of the broadcast flag mandate 
do not explicitly foreclose fair use copying.62  Indeed, the 
Commission repeatedly stated that "our goal of preventing the 
indiscriminate redistribution of digital broadcast TV content 
'will not (1) interfere with or preclude consumers from copying 
broadcast programming and using or redistributing it within the 
home or similar personal environment as consistent with 
copyright law."63  But much fair use copying falls into the gap 
                     
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 See id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
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between the rule and its implementation.  Moreover, the flag 
could chill public debate and access to information in violation 
of the First Amendment’s protection of free speech. 
1. HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT 
 The Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution64 
vests power in Congress to grant limited monopolies over certain 
works.65  The Framers were concerned about granting absolute 
monopolies, and were influenced by passage of copyright law in 
England, the Statute of Ann,66 that limited the term of copyright 
protection. 
 As a result, the drafter of the Copyright clause, unlike 
other power-granting clauses in the Constitution, specified how 
and why Congress could use this power.67  Congress was not given 
the power to simply to enact copyrights for its own reasons or 
for as long as it saw fit.68  Rather, Congress was only given 
power "to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts" by 
granting authors an "exclusive Right" "for limited Times."69 
 In addition, the Supreme Court has consistently stressed 
that the purpose of the copyright law is not the narrow 
                     
64 U.S. Const. art. I, 8, cl. 8. 
65 Id. 
66 Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 
(Eng.). 
67 Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L.Rev 
1057, 1062; see eg. U.S. Const. art. I, 5. (specify) 
68 See id. 
69 Id. 
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protectionism of profits for copyright owners.70  In Twentieth 
Century Music Co. v. Aiken71, the Supreme Court, in analyzing 
copyright law in the context of technological change, stressed 
that when ambiguities arise, copyright law should be viewed in 
light of its basic purpose to give the public benefit, rather 
than rewarding authors.72  Although the Court was analyzing 
copyright law through the now outdated Copyright Act of 1909, 
the proposition is still relevant to current copyright 
analysis.73 
2. THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE FIRST AMENDMENT & COPYRIGHT LAW 
 Copyright protection has enjoyed increased protection in 
the United States as content has become increasingly exported 
around the world.74  For over thirty years, however, there has 
been an uneasy balance between copyright law and First Amendment 
                     
70 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 
(1948) ("The copyright law . . . makes reward to the owner a 
secondary consideration."); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576-77 (1977). 
71 422 U.S. 151 (1975); see also  United States v. Paramount 
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. at 158 ("[R]eward to the author or 
artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of 
his creative genius."). 
72 Id. at 156. ("[c]reative work is to be encouraged and 
rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause 
of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and 
the other arts (citation omitted)...When technological change 
has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must 
be construed in light of this basic purpose.") 
73 See Goldstein, supra note 1 at 102. 
74 See Nimmer on Copyright 
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protection.75  The general rule is that free speech cannot 
violate copyright law.76  However, there are those that argue 
some speech should be allowed to violate copyright law.77 
                     
75 Important works include C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience 
What it Wants, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 311 (1997); Yochai Benkler, Free 
as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on the 
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354 (1999); 
Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, 
Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 23 (2001); Yochai 
Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of 
Information Production, 22 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 81 (2002); 
Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the 
Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 173 (2003); Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and 
Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of 
Expression, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 283 (1979); Paul Goldstein, 
Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 983 (1970); 
Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and 
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke L.J. 147 
(1998); Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. 
Rev. 1057 (2001); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a 
Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L.J. 283 (1996); Neil 
Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment 
Skein, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2001); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market 
Hierarchy and Copyright in our System of Free Expression, 53 
Vand. L. Rev. 1879 (2000); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright 
Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and 
Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180 (1970); L. Ray Patterson, Free 
Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (1987); Jed 
Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's 
Constitutionality, 112 Yale L.J. 1 (2002); Eugene Volokh, 
Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After 
Eldred, 44 Liquormart, Saderup, and Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 
697 (2003); Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the 
Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's "Total 
Concept and Feel," 38 Emory L.J. 393 (1989).  Though he did not 
write explicitly in First Amendment terms, Professor Chafee 
deserves credit for exploring the main arguments first. 
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 
45 Colum. L. Rev. 503 (1945). 
76 See Goldstein, supra note 1. 
77 Id. 
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 In 1970, as Congress debated what eventually produced the 
Copyright Act of 197678, Professors Melville Nimmer and Paul 
Goldstein published important articles on the balance between 
copyright law and free speech.79  Professor Nimmer used a  
“definitional balancing” test to determine the proper balance 
between free speech and copyright law.80  He created a rule that 
differentiated between expression and ideas, and posited that 
expression was copyrightable while the ideas and facts contained 
within them were protected by free speech.81   
 His ideas were given force of law by the Supreme Court in 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,82 in which 
the Court held that copyright, through its limited protection of 
authors, creates an incentive to produce speech that otherwise 
would not exist.83   However, Professor Nimmer also stressed that 
some expression could not be separated from its idea and was too 
important to risk being censored by the right-holders.84  He 
cited Abraham Zabruder’s footage of President Kennedy’s 
assassination and Ronald Haeberle’s photographs of the My Lai 
Massacre during the Vietnam War.85  Professor Nimmer advocated 
                     
78 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2000)). 
79 Nimmer, supra note 1; Goldstein, supra note 1. 
80 Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1189. 
81 Id. 
82 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
83 Id. at 558. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 1198. 
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for a compulsory license to these expressions for those who 
copied them.86  Although these examples are extreme, they 
illustrate why copyright protection is not absolute in either 
length or strength. 
 Professor Goldstein was concerned about overly broad 
copyright protection and the accumulation of rights by large 
media firms, which he called “enterprise monopolies.”87  To 
illustrate the dangers of both overly broad copyright protection 
and abuses by powerful media companies, Professor Goldstein 
cited Rosemount Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc.,88 in 
which Howard Hughes tried to use copyright protection to 
suppress an unauthorized biography about him.  One of Hughes’ 
companies bought the rights to the underlying articles the 
author used and sued for infringement.  The Second Circuit 
reversed a preliminary injunction against the publication of the 
biography saying the defendants had a strong fair use claim.89  
Professor Goldstein supported the court’s decision because 
Hughes used copyright to censor expression rather than promote 
it.90 
                     
86 Id. 
87 David McGowan, Why The First Amendment Cannot Dictate 
Copyright Policy, 65 U. Pitt L. Rev. 281 (citing Goldstein, 
supra note 1 at 987). 
88 Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d 
Cir. 1966). 
89 Id. at 307-307. 
90 McGowan, supra note 65 at 287; Goldstein, supra note 1, at 
985-986. 
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 Contrary to Hughes’ attempt to use copyright law to limit 
the public’s access to information, a fundamental goal of 
copyright law is to promote “broad public availability of 
literature, music, and the other arts” through a system of 
private reward to authors.91   
 However, proponents of copyright protection claim copyright 
law does not abridge free speech.92  Instead, they claim the 
opposite is true, and that copyright law is an incentive to 
create speech that otherwise would not exist.93    
 The Supreme Court in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enterprises94 stated that copyright law functions as an 
“engine of free expression”95 that gives economic incentive to 
stimulate works for the public good.  According to the Court, 
copyright law protects the expression of the idea and not the 
idea or facts themselves.96  However, this does not mean that 
copyright law is unconstrained by the First Amendment.   
 The purpose of copyright law is not simply the narrow 
protectionism of profits for copyright owners.  Rather, its 
purpose is to stimulate wider access to creative works.97  In 
                     
91 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 
(1975). 
92 See id. 
93 Id. 
94 471 U.S. 539 (1985) 
95 Id. at 558. 
96 Id. 
97 United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) 
(“the copyright law...makes reward to the owner a secondary 
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addition, certain fair uses expand consumers’ rights to use 
copyrighted works.98  This is this balance that comes into play 
in today’s debate surrounding the broadcast flag. 
3. FAIR USE 
 Copyright holders enjoy many exclusive rights.99  Congress 
has provided copyright owners with a variety of exclusive rights 
in their copyrighted work, including the right to reproduce, 
prepare derivative works, distribute copies, perform, and 
publicly display those works.100  However, those exclusive rights 
"do not give a copyright holder control over all uses."101   
 Fair use was originally developed in the common law and was 
considered necessary to help courts “avoid rigid application of 
copyright statute, when, on occasion, it would stifle the very 
creativity which that law is designed to foster.”102  The doctrine 
of fair use was given statutory recognition in the Copyright Act 
of 1976.103  In codifying fair use, Congress did not intend to 
                     
consideration.”); Zaccchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 
433 U.S. 562, 576-77 (1977).  
98 Id. 
99 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
100 Id. 
101 Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U.S. 390, 393 (1968). 
102 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright 13.05 
(1998 ed.) (citing Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. 
American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
103 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2000)). 
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“change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.”104  The statute uses 
four factors to determine if an allegedly fair use is protected:  
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether 
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes;  
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;  
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and  
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work. 105 
 However, it was not until the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Sony v. Universal106 (the “Betamax” case) that the high court 
weighed in with its interpretation of what uses would be 
protected by the fair use statute.  In Betamax, several studios 
sued Sony, manufacturer of the Betamax recorder, for 
contributory liability for copyright infringement because 
                     
104 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) ("no real definition 
of the concept has emerged ... [and] no generally applicable 
definition is possible ... each case raising the question must 
be decided on its own facts."). 
105 The fair use doctrine was codified in Section 107 of the 
Copyright Act of 1976. 
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982) provides: 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 [defining the 
copyright holder's exclusive rights], the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies 
or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, 
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.  
106 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
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Betamax users could record television broadcasts without the 
copyright holders’ permission.107  The studios feared consumer 
copying would erode their profits and take away their control 
over copyrighted works.108  The district court found the studios 
failed to prove that the VCR would damage their profits.109  The 
Supreme Court held, using the four-prong fair use test, that 
non-commercial, home-use recording of programs broadcast for 
free over public airwaves does not constitute copyright 
infringement.110  Although the holding is narrow, it specifically 
gave fair use protection to consumer time-shifting of content.111 
 However, critics of the decision have pointed to its narrow 
holding and reliance on the district court’s factual findings as 
weighing against broad fair use protection. 112  In addition, the 
Court’s holding was based on a narrow 5-4 majority.  Indeed, 
some suggest that the Court's conclusions "would be different 
based on a more contemporary record."113  Thus, it is unclear how 
protective the Sony opinion is outside the narrow context the 
Court defined. 
                     
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 454. 
109 Id.  History has in fact proven that the VCR not only did not 
damage profits, but actually created the studios largest profit 
center in home video and DVD sales. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 454-455. 
112 See Patry, supra note 80, at 201. 
113 Id. 
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 Recently, the Federal Circuit recognized the continued 
vitality of the fair use doctrine in the digital realm, 
explaining that the Digital Millenium Copyright Act does not 
"allow any copyright owner, through a combination of contractual 
terms and technological measures, to repeal the fair use 
doctrine."114 
 The Supreme Court, in reviewing a challenge to the recent 
Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act in Eldred v. Ashcroft,115 held 
that one of the reasons the copyright extension act did not 
violate the Copyright Clause was because of the fair use 
protections already in place to ensure that copyright holders 
did not infringe on protected rights.116  
 Moreover, movie studios’ profits have not eroded as a 
result of fair use time-shifting.117  Instead, the studios’ entire 
business model now depends on the home video market that 
developed as a result of the Court’s protection of the VCR.118  
Had the Court agreed with the studios’ fears of lost profits as 
a result of the VCR, the entire home video market would have 
been prematurely shut down.119 
                     
114 Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 
F.3d 1178, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
115 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 EFF Comments, supra note 2. 
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 Post-Sony decisions focus on the potential adverse impact 
on copyright holder’s future profits.120  This too, is the major 
argument content holders cite as the reason a broadcast flag is 
necessary.121  However, to overcome a consumer fair use defense, 
content holders must demonstrate a meaningful likelihood that 
future harm exists.122  Given the history of VCR time-shifting and 
its positive impact on content holders’ profits, digital time 
and space shifting should also continue to be protected under 
fair use, regardless of their arguable differences. 
 Moreover, it is unclear if the broadcast flag is 
technologically capable of protecting all fair uses.123  As a 
result, the Senate should wait to confirm that fair uses are 
protected before granting the FCC additional jurisdiction to 
implement the broadcast flag. 
D. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS 
 The First Amendment to the Constitution states "Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably 
                     
120 See MPAA Comments, supra note 4 
121 See id. 
122 Harper & Row Publishers v. The Nation, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) 
[hereinafter The Nation].  
123 See Fred von Lohmann, Digital Rights Management: The Skeptics' 
View (2002), available at 
http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/20030401_drm_skeptics_view.php (noting 
that the fair use doctrine has been modified by the courts to 
keep up with new technology and should continue to do so).  
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to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances."124 
 The Supreme Court has expressed that the scope of the First 
Amendment is versatile; the artwork of Jackson Pollack, the 
music of Arnold Schoenber, or the Jabberwocky verse of Lewis 
Carroll are “unquestionably shielded.”125  In addition, the First 
Amendment establishes that access to information is a 
fundamental value of the American political system.126 
1. COMPUTER CODE IS PROTECTED SPEECH 
 Currently HDTV tuner cards and devices like Digital to 
Audio converters allow users to create personal networks that 
enable time and place shifting within their homes and personal 
devices.127  Individual programming is necessary to operate these 
home networks.128  In addition, individuals use open source code 
to design programs that function in similar ways as commercially 
available encoding programs.129  Under the proposed broadcast 
flag, any individual programming for devices that receive or 
transmit content is prohibited unless it contains and recognizes 
the broadcast flag, and is approved by the FCC.130 
                     
124 U.S. CONST. Amend. I. 
125 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 
U.S. 557, 569 (1995). 
126 Id. 
127 See Fred Von Lohman, supra note 105. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
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 However, the First Amendment’s protection has also been 
applied to computer code.131  As a result, individuals that 
program home video networks using open source code are protected 
by the First Amendment, as set forth below. 
 In Junger v. Daley,132 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal 
analyzed whether computer source code falls under First 
Amendment protection.133  The plaintiff, Professor Peter Junger, 
facially challenged provisions of the Export Administration 
Regulations that banned exports of encryption software.134  The 
court held that even non-traditional speech like musical scores 
and computer source code, although not understood by the 
majority of people, are still protected by the First Amendment 
because they express information and ideas within their 
respective fields.135  Although the court differentiated between 
functional and expressive speech, and noted that limits on 
functional speech would receive less scrutiny, it stressed that 
both forms of speech and hybrid forms still receive First 
Amendment protection.136 
                     
131 Universal Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F3d 429 (2nd Cir. 
2001); Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000(holding 
computer code is protected like any other speech even if a 
computer is required to understand its expression or function). 
132 209 F3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000). 
133 Id; see also Universal Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F3d 429 
(2nd Cir. 2001). 
134 Id.  
135 Id. at 484. 
136 Id. 
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 In Universal Studios v. Corley,137 the Second Circuit also 
analyzed the difference between functional and expressive 
speech.  The lawsuit was brought by the motion picture studios 
under the Digital Millenium Copyright Act to enjoin defendants 
from posting or downloading software that decrypted DVDs.138  The 
court upheld the injunction, holding that computer code does 
receive First Amendment protection.139  However, the court also 
found that defendants’ decryption software functioned solely to 
circumvent technological locks on DVDs, and was therefore 
unprotected due to its capacity to promote piracy.140 
 The court did not mention decryption software for personal 
use.  In addition, the court held the injunction did not ban 
more speech than was necessary to further the government’s 
interest to prevent piracy.  As a result, personal programming 
of home networks should still be protected by the courts under 
the First Amendment. 
 Home network programming, like DVD decryption software, has 
both functional and expressive components.141  Users create home 
networks to function by reading and transmitting content to 
facilitate time and place shifting.142  However, unlike the 
defendants in Junger and Corley, home networks do not upload or 
                     
137 273 F3d 429 (2nd Cir. 2001). 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 432. 
140 Id. 
141 See Fred Von Lohman, supra note 105. 
142 Id. 
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export any code.143  Moreover, unlike the defendants in Corley, 
users that develop code to facilitate home networks, even if for 
personal use, would be shut down by the broadcast flag.144   
 In addition, it would be inconsistent for the FCC to shut 
down home networks that facilitate time-shifting because it 
allows DVDs to time and place shift by letting consumers play 
content on any DVD player, whether within the home, car, or 
computer.145  The broadcast flag would shut down all personally 
networked devices that allow time and place shifting unless the 
devices are pre-approved by the FCC.146  Moreover, the broadcast 
flag would not allow consumers to program code for commercially 
approved devices that did not interact with each other.147  As a 
result, if the Senate does not protect personal software that 
facilitates home networks before it grants the FCC additional 
jurisdiction to implement the broadcast flag, it may be 
violating programmers’ First Amendment rights.  
2. COMPILATION OF IDEAS IS PROTECTED SPEECH 
 Access to the media is an important right protected by the 
First Amendment.148  An informed public is essential to political 
                     
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech, supra note 1. 
147 Id. 
148 See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) 
("[The First Amendment] rests on the assumption that the widest 
possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public. 
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discussion, elections, and in maintaining globally competitive 
levels of education.149  With the advent of digital media, the 
public increasingly gets information in more diverse forms, 
places and methods than ever before.150  As a result of increases 
in technology that allow for more personalized and portable 
content, copyright holders are increasingly fearful they lack 
the control to regulate the new media expansion.151 
 First Amendment protection does not require a speaker to 
generate, as an original matter, each item featured in the 
                     
. . ."); Lamont v. Postmaster General of the United States, 381 
U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).  
Nevertheless, "[t]he dissemination of ideas can accomplish 
nothing if otherwise willing addresses are not free to receive 
and consider them"; Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976). 
The First Amendment "protection afforded is to the 
communication, to its source and to its recipients both."; The 
right to receive information and ideas is an inherent corollary 
of the rights of free speech and press that are explicitly 
guaranteed by the Constitution. Board of Educ., Island Trees 
Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); 
CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395-96 (1981) (The First 
Amendment includes "the right of the public to receive suitable 
access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas 
and experiences. . . .") (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)); The right of the public to 
receive suitable access to social, political, aesthetic, moral, 
and other ideas and experiences may not be constitutionally 
abridged either by Congress or by the Federal Communications 
Commission. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 
(1969). 
149 See Brandeis concurrence, Whitney 
150 See Center for Democracy & Tech, supra note 40 at 30 (noting 
how consumers’ access to digital media may be hindered by the 
broadcast flag). 
151 See MPAA Comments, supra note 4. 
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communication.152  Cable operators, for example, engage in 
protected speech activities even when they only select 
programming originally produced by others.153  In addition, the 
presentation of an edited compilation of speech generated by 
other persons is a staple of most newspapers' opinion pages, 
which fall within First Amendment security.154   
 Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the 
public has a First Amendment right to receive information.155  The 
                     
152 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 
U.S. 557, 570 (1995). 
153 Id.  (citing Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 
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of the rights of free speech and press that are explicitly 
guaranteed by the Constitution. Board of Educ., Island Trees 
Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); 
CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395-96 (1981) (The First 
Amendment includes "the right of the public to receive suitable 
access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas 
and experiences. . . .") (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)); The right of the public to 
receive suitable access to social, political, aesthetic, moral, 
and other ideas and experiences may not be constitutionally 
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right to receive information is especially significant in 
electronic media.  In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the 
Supreme Court stated: "It is the right of the viewers and 
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is 
paramount. . . . It is the right of the public to receive 
suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other 
ideas and experiences which is crucial here."  
 In Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC156, the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals cited Red Lion for the proposition that "the interests 
of viewers should be considered 'paramount' in the First 
Amendment calculus."157  In response to cases brought by Turner 
Broadcasting System, the court struck down, as a violation of 
the First Amendment, the FCC's "must carry" rules.158  These rules 
required cable systems to carry all local broadcast stations 
upon their request and without compensation, without regard for 
the channel capacity of the system or the alternative viewing 
choices foreclosed as a result.159  The court recognized that the 
"must carry" rules prevented cable subscribers from receiving 
cable networks' information and entertainment programming 
                     
abridged either by Congress or by the Federal Communications 
Commission. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 
(1969). 
156 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
157 Id. at 1445. 
158 Id. 
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services, although such programming might be preferred over that 
carried by local broadcast stations.160 
 The Betamax Court's conclusion that time-shifting is worthy 
of protection results in an environment in which the benefits of 
expanded access to information by the consuming public made 
possible by new technologies are accorded great weight.  
However, the Court did not directly cite any of its classic 
First Amendment cases to support its holding.  It did, however, 
cite its 1983 decision in Community Television of Southern 
California v. Gottfried,161 as to "the public interest in making 
television broadcasting more available."162  This view bears a 
strong resemblance to language from several landmark First 
Amendment cases, such as Associated Press ("[First Amendment] . 
. . rests on the assumption that the widest possible 
dissemination from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential 
to the welfare of the public"),163 and Red Lion ("It is the right 
of the public to receive suitable access to . . . ideas and 
experiences which is crucial . . .").164 
                     
160 Id. 
161 459 U.S. 498, 508 (1983). 
162 464 U.S. at 454. 
163 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). 
164 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). 
The Court's language in Betamax also bears a striking similarity 
to its own earlier summary of the district court opinion in that 
case: 
Moreover, the court found that the purpose of this [time-
shifting] use served the public interest in increasing access to 
television programming, an interest that "is consistent with the 
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 However, The Nation,165 decided by the Supreme Court at the 
end of the 1985 Term, made clear that the importance of 
receiving particular information, standing alone, does not 
justify copying that adversely affects the marketability of the 
work.166  The case involved President Gerald Ford's memoirs.167  
The publishers and copyright holders, Harper & Row and Reader's 
Digest, intended to release the memoirs as a book but sold 
prepublication excerpts exclusively to Time magazine.168  As a 
result, marketability is a large factor in determining protected 
consumer uses. 
3. THE BROADCAST FLAG COULD VIOLATE CONSUMERS COMPILATION RIGHTS 
 Here, consumers’ compilation of edited content is protected 
speech because it increases access to information.  As a result, 
the Senate should protect these rights before it grants the FCC 
additional jurisdiction to implement the broadcast flag. 
III. CRITIQUE OF BROADCAST FLAG 
A. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITION 
 The broadcast flag, as a governmental mandate requiring 
electronics manufacturers to equip their products with broadcast 
flag recognition technology, amounts to an unconstitutional 
                     
First Amendment policy of providing the fullest possible access 
to information through the public airwaves." 
165 See The Nation, supra note 102. 
166 Id. at 542. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
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condition.169  If the government had directly imposed the 
broadcast flag’s limitations on First Amendment speech, it would 
be unconstitutional.170  Therefore, the broadcast flag creates 
state action even though private actors are enforcing its 
controls.  Thus, the broadcast flag is unconstitutional because 
it allows private content holders to limit the public’s 
constitutional right to receive information through time and 
place shifting. 
B. INFRINGED FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 In Turner Broadcasting v. FCC,171 the Supreme Court noted 
that although an asserted governmental interest may be 
important, when the government defends restrictions on speech, 
as it would by granting the FCC additional jurisdiction to pass 
the flag, “it must do more than simply ‘posit the existence of 
the disease sought to be cured.’”172  The government “must 
demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely 
conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate 
these harms in a direct and material way.”173   
 Here, there is not enough proof that illegal internet 
redistribution of content, a potentially important government 
interest, is so egregious and costly to the movie industry that 
                     
169 See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech, supra note 1. 
170 See id. 
171 512 U.S. 622, 644 (1994) 
172 Id. (quoting Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F2d. 1434, 1455 
(D.C. Cir. 1985)). 
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it would justify chilling protected speech.174  Moreover, there 
are indicators that time and place shifting are giving content 
holders increased abilities to create more valuable personalized 
advertising to consumers based on their viewing habits.175  Tivo, 
a time shifting service, recently announced its increased 
ability to monitor viewing habits thereby increasing the value 
in television advertising.176 
 Moreover, the broadcast flag infringes protected computer 
code in the form of programming home networks.177  Home 
programming can either be viewed as expressive or functional 
speech, or a hybrid of both.178  In either case, computer code is 
protected First Amendment speech and cannot be infringed 
lightly.  In addition, consumer-driven innovation is cut off 
when users cannot tinker with existing technologies or develop 
new ones that challenge market leaders.179 
C. THE BROADCAST FLAG IS OVERINCLUSIVE AND UNDERINCLUSIVE 
 In addition, despite the FCC's protestations to the 
contrary, the broadcast flag scheme will necessarily involve the 
agency in shaping copyright law and the rights of content owners 
                     
174 See EFF Comments, supra note 4. 
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177 See COMPUTER CODE IS PROTECTED SPEECH, supra Part II. 
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179 See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech, supra note 4. 
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and consumers.180  Making copyright law and policy is not the 
FCC's job.  It is Congress' job.181 
  While it is true that the TV broadcast flag scheme does not 
completely bar a consumer from making a copy of her favorite TV 
show, it does prevent consumers from engaging in other lawful 
activities under copyright law.182  For example, as the D.C. 
Circuit noted in American Library Association v. FCC,183 the 
broadcast flag would limit the ability of libraries and other 
educators to use broadcast clips for distance learning via the 
Internet that is permitted pursuant to the TEACH Act, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, 13301, 
amending 17 U.S.C. 110, 112 & 882 (2002).184 
 This highlights that although proponents of the flag 
justify it as prohibiting only "indiscriminate" redistribution 
of content over the Internet, it actually prohibits both 
redistribution over the Internet and personal uses of content, 
regardless of their legality.  For example, if a congressman 
wants to email a snippet of his appearance on the national TV 
news to his home office, the broadcast flag scheme would 
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prohibit him from doing so.185  Video bloggers would similarly be 
unable to post broadcast TV clips on their blogs.186 
 The fact that the broadcast flag will limit lawful uses of 
copyrighted content was detailed in the Congressional Research 
Service Report entitled Copy Protection of Digital Television: 
The Broadcast Flag (May 11, 2005).187  CRS concluded that while 
the broadcast flag is intended to "prevent the indiscriminate 
redistribution of [digital broadcast] content over the Internet 
or through similar means," the purpose of the flag was not to 
impede a consumer's ability to copy or use content lawfully in 
the home, nor was the policy intended to "foreclose use of the 
Internet to send digital broadcast content where it can be 
adequately protected from indiscriminate redistribution."188   
 The broadcast flag has the potential to hinder activities 
that are protected as "fair use" under existing copyright law.189  
For example, a consumer who wished to record a program to watch 
at a later time, or at a different location (time-shifting, and 
space-shifting, respectively), might be prevented when otherwise 
approved technologies do not allow for such activities, or do 
not integrate well with one another, or with older, "legacy" 
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devices.190  In addition, future fair uses may be precluded by 
these limitations.191  For example, a student would be unable to 
email herself a copy of a project with digital video content 
because no current secure system exists for email transmission.192 
 Thus, the broadcast flag gives the FCC power to determine 
consumers' rights under copyright law and under the First 
Amendment.193  It is Congress' duty, not the FCC's, to find the 
proper balance of those rights, and Congress is limited in its 
regulation of protected speech.  As a result, Congress should 
not hastily determine these rights and limits.  
D. THE BRODCAST FLAG IS NOT THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS TO 
CURBING INTERET PIRACY 
1. SECONDARY LIABILITY GIVES MOVIE STUDIOS A POWERFUL TOOL TO 
HOLD ELECTRONICS MANUFACTURERS LIABLE FOR COPYRIGHT 
INFRINGEMENT. 
 The Supreme Court’s recent holding in MGM v. Grokster194 
creates an additional tool for copyright holders against 
internet piracy.195  The Supreme Court articulated an “inducement” 
test that held distributors of software could be liable for 
contributory infringement, regardless of the software's lawful 
uses, based on evidence that the software was distributed to 
                     
190 Id. 
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192 CRS Report at 5.3. 
193 See EFF Comments, supra note 4. 
194 125 S.Ct. 2764. 
195 See EFF Comments, supra note 4.  
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promote copyright infringement.196  This powerful tool continues 
to help content holders deter copyright infringement.197  As a 
result, the broadcast flag is not necessary as additional 
copyright protection. 
 Moreover, the threat of litigation will continue to chill 
emerging technologies that may induce copyright infringement.198  
Product developers have, and will continue to limit their 
products’ functionality for fear of being held liable for 
copyright infringement.199 
 In 2001, four lawsuits claiming various copyright 
infringements were filed against SONICblue, the manufacturer of 
a personal video recorder (PVR) named the ReplayTV 4000.200  The 
ReplayTV 4000 featured a number of unique features that enhanced 
consumer autonomy including: 1. Send Show Feature, which allowed 
consumers to send digital copies of recorded content to a select 
few Replay customers, which is essence extended place-shifting 
2. AutoSkip Feature, which allowed consumers to automatically 
skip commercials, and 3. The Library Feature, like all PVR’s, 
allows consumers to time-shift content.201   
                     
196 MGM v. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2768. 
197 See EFF Comments, supra note 4. 
198 Aaron A. Hurowitz, Copyright in the New Millennium: Is the 
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 The litigation forced SONICblue into bankruptcy.202  The 
subsequent owner of the technology removed the AutoSkip and Send 
Show features, and the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the 
suit.203  However, Replay never recovered in the marketplace and 
those features are unavailable in any commercially available 
products.204 
2. THE DIGITAL MILLENIUM COPYRIGHT ACT GIVES MOVIE STUDIOS A 
POWERFUL TOOL TO DETER CONSUMER COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
 The Digital Millenium Copyright Act, which was passed in 
part for the same copyright infringement concerns as the 
broadcast flag,205 gives copyright holders an additional tool to 
deter copyright infringement.206  Although it was not intended to 
alter the balance between copyright owners' exclusive right and 
the public's ability to make fair use of copyrighted works, it 
has been used to do so.207 
 The Digital Millenium Copyright Act actually creates a new 
set of rights to control access to copyrighted materials that, 
although meant to deter copyright infringement, also affect fair 
use protections.208  The Act allows content holders to 
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aggressively litigate against parties that circumvent digital 
protections, even if those uses do not violate the content 
owner’s copyright.209  As a result, content holders have strong 
preventative weapons against copyright infringement. 
 In Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc.,210 
the Federal Circuit confirmed that fair uses defenses did not 
theoretically change under the DMCA.211  However, in Universal 
Studios v. Corley,212 the Second Circuit Court of Appeal seemingly 
limited the scope of fair use defenses under the Digital 
Millenium Copyright Act by stressing that fair use does not 
entitle a user to copyrighted material by the user’s preferred 
technique or in the format of the original.213  The court heard a 
challenge to the posting of software that allowed consumers to 
back-up purchased DVDs.214  The software also allowed, through 
circumvention of DVD copy-protection, to encode DVDs and post 
them online for redistribution.215 
 As a result of litigation enforcing the Digital Millenium 
Copyright Act, consumers are deterred from internet piracy and 
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creating programs that circumvent technological locks.216  Thus, 
content holders have a strong stranglehold on copyright 
protection.217  As a result, the broadcast flag is not necessary 
to protect copyrighted content. 
 Moreover, the Digital Millenium Copyright Act shows the 
dangers of increased copyright protection.  Although the Digital 
Millenium Copyright Act explicitly retained the existing "fair 
use" regime in the digital context, in practice fair use rights 
were altered.218  As the Senate Report put it, the Digital 
Millenium Copyright Act strikes a balance that aims to "make 
available via the Internet the movies, music, software, and 
literary works that are the fruit of American creative genius."219  
 However, like in Chamberlain, fair use rights are 
challenged under the Digital Millenium Copyright Act.   
3. THE BROADCAST FLAG CHILLS TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
 Current technological limitations help spur the next 
generation of product innovation.  As the D.C. Circuit 
recognized in ALA v. FCC220, the broadcast flag unlawfully gave 
the agency unprecedented authority over consumer electronics and 
computer devices and any other device that can demodulate a 
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television signal.221  Thus, not only would television sets need 
to be pre-approved by the FCC because they receive television 
signals, but the agency would have the power to pre-approve 
computer software, digital video recorders, cellphones, game 
consoles and even iPods if they can receive recorded digital 
content.222 
  The FCC does not have the expertise to engage in this kind 
of determination, and if given this authority by Congress, the 
FCC will slow or eliminate the rollout of new technologies, both 
private innovations meant for strictly personal use, and 
innovations meant for broader consumption.223 
 It has been argued that the FCC’s certification process 
would work in regulating these devices because thirteen 
technologies submitted to the FCC were initially approved.224  
However, prior to submitting their products to the FCC, several 
manufacturers removed legal and consumer-friendly features of 
their devices.225  In addition, due to the revolving nature of the 
FCC’s chairman and commissioners, it is likely that fear of 
agency denial will chill innovation. 
E. THE SENATE SHOULD PROTECT THESE RIGHTS BEFORE GRANTING THE 
FCC ADDITIONAL POWER 
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 Any legislation to reinstate the broadcast flag should be 
considered in regular order.  If Congress ultimately decides to 
legislate with regard to the broadcast flag, it should do so in 
regular order, and not as part of a budget resolution or 
appropriations bill.  These matters are not germane to the 
budget and appropriations processes.226  Indeed, they are far too 
important and controversial to be legislated on a spending bill. 
If Congress ultimately decides that it must try and legislate 
broadcast flag, it should do so only after considerable debate 
and public input. 
 There is considerable evidence the public is greatly 
concerned with the government's efforts to mandate digital 
television and radio content protection for digital devices.227 
Over 5000 individual consumer comments were filed in opposition 
to the flag at the FCC, where so many consumer comments are 
rare, and tens of thousands of citizens have contacted their 
Congressional representatives over the past six months (since 
the D.C. Circuit's decision) urging that the broadcast flag not 
be reinstated.228  Clearly, this is an issue that deserves a full 
and fair hearing, and not to be simply attached to a spending 
bill. 
CONCLUSION 
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 The broadcast flag would give the FCC unprecedented control 
over a wide variety of consumer electronics and computer 
devices.229  As a result, Congress should wait to determine the 
true threats of piracy from digital television, and should 
protect consumer rights and evaluate market solutions instead of 
furthering government regulation.  The broadcast flag has been 
referred as narrow because it purports to do nothing more than 
protect content holders from rampant piracy.  However, for the 
reasons discussed above, the FCC rule is anything but narrow and 
could unconstitutionally infringe protected speech and fair 
uses. 
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